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Domain Atlas

Behavioral-health & crisis triage

Risk scores and triage rankers deciding whose crisis is seen first — where the rare event is nearly impossible to predict reliably, the flag moves a proxy more surely than the outcome, and a score can quietly gate access to care. The counterweight is on the record too: a national health system's opioid risk-mitigation dashboard, evaluated in a randomized design across its medical centers, was reported as associated with a decrease in mortality among the at-risk patients it covered — a benefit direction this domain is rarely credited with, and an outcome for people who sit outside every diagram here.

Use cases

What AI is doing here

Suicide-risk prediction & outreach

Predictive

EHR- or registry-based models that flag patients at elevated suicide risk to trigger clinician review or outreach — rare-event scoring in which the large majority of flags are false positives.

Crisis-line severity triage

Predictive

Machine-learning severity rankers that reorder crisis-line contacts so the most-at-risk are reached first.

Conversational mental-health intake & support

Generative

Conversational systems that handle self-referral, triage, or supportive self-help contact for mental-health care before, between, or in place of clinician time.

Substance & overdose risk scoring

Predictive

Risk scores embedded in prescribing and pharmacy workflows — proprietary scores that can gate a person's access to controlled medications, or in-house scores that mandate clinical review of the highest-scored patients.

Clinician fidelity & care-quality scoring

Predictive

AI that scores the clinician's own practice from session or call audio — coverage rising from small hand-review samples toward every encounter — where the instrument measures the workforce, and the governance question is who calibrates the measurement people are managed by.

Passive safety-surveillance monitoring

Predictive

Always-on monitoring of people in institutional care or custody of a duty-bearing body — school-account scanning, ward sensor systems — flagging risk from ambient activity rather than a clinical encounter, typically under contested consent and without published error rates.

In-chat crisis detection & referral

Predictive

Language models scanning live conversation streams — therapy chats, companion chatbots — for suicide and self-harm language, raising an alert to the treating clinician or an automated hotline referral, typically with no published accuracy on the population being read.

Case files

What has gone wrong and right

Documented deployments, presented as model organizations calibrated to the evidence, with full citations.

Two surfaces, one program: NYC's teen teletherapy, its suicide-alert algorithm, and the ad trackers on the sign-up page

New York City, New York, United States (Department of Health and Mental Hygiene)

In November 2023 New York City launched NYC Teenspace, buying population access to a commercial teletherapy platform for every resident aged 13 to 17 — a $26M three-year contract, free at the point of use, with parental consent and a New York-licensed therapist. Inside the therapy chat runs a proprietary NLP model that scans teen-authored messages for suicide and self-harm language and fires an urgent alert to the teen's own treating clinician; the algorithm never acts on its own, and in the first six months it flagged roughly 50 teens (under 1% of users) while therapists handled 36 high-risk events. Two things about the oversight record define this case. The model has never been examined by anyone outside the vendor: its one published accuracy figure (83% agreement with a human expert) is a vendor claim from a 2020 study of ADULT platform data, and the independent evaluation the health department said in September 2024 it was planning had still not appeared by mid-2026. Meanwhile the surface anyone COULD inspect — the public sign-up pages — was inspected, by a parent-privacy coalition running a free tracker audit tool: 15 ad trackers and 34 cookies sending teen visitors' identifiers to Meta, Amazon, Google, Microsoft and others, several of them companies the city was simultaneously suing over teen mental-health harm. The vendor stripped the trackers on December 11, 2024 and cut the sign-up form to age and zip code, and a week after that the city said the contract's Data Security Rider would be amended to bar marketing and advertising use of teen data outright — and within four weeks advocates documented trackers again on pages beyond the landing page, including the page hosting the revised privacy policy. The audited surface and the algorithmic surface never met.

Explore this deployment in the PAN Lab →

System map

Who is in the system and what pushes on it

Who is in the system

  • Frontline workers. Caseworkers, screeners, eligibility staff — the operator network whose judgment the system augments or erodes.
  • Supervisors & QA. The institutional correction layer: overrides, second reads, quality review.
  • Agency leadership. Owns procurement, policy, and the authority map; answers for the system publicly.
  • Served people & families. Those the decisions land on. Deliberately outside the PAN dynamics — their outcomes are measured, never simulated.
  • Vendors. Build and update the systems; hold the information asymmetry procurement must govern.
  • Regulators & oversight bodies. Boards, auditors, data-protection officers, inspectorates — external correction capacity.
  • Advocates & community organizations. Surface harms institutions do not see; historically the earliest accurate signal.

Dominant pressures

  • Caseload surge. Demand outruns staffing; per-case attention shrinks and review becomes triage.
  • Reviewer bottleneck. One fixed-capacity checking stage sits between AI output and consequence; everything queues behind it.
  • Vendor opacity. The deploying institution cannot inspect the model, data, or update pipeline it is accountable for.
  • Deadline pressure. Statutory or managerial timeliness rules reward fast approval of machine output over slow disagreement.
  • Compliance over substance. Paper controls (sign-offs, checklists) satisfy audits while the behavior they describe erodes.

Governance

Questions leaders should be asking

  1. 1. Does the evidence show this system changed the outcome it exists to change, or only an easier-to-measure proxy like screening or contact rates — and did anyone independent of the builder produce that evidence?
  2. 2. Under a rare event, most flags will be false — so what does each flag cost a clinician's attention, and what does the alert displace when it interrupts a caseload already at capacity?
  3. 3. Can a person see and contest a score that shapes their access to care — and does anyone check whether it reads some groups as higher-risk for reasons unrelated to their actual need?
  4. 4. When a mental-health tool is withdrawn — by its vendor, a regulator, or a lapsed budget — what happens to the people mid-care and to the intimate data they entrusted to it?
  5. 5. How far ahead of the harm does this flag fire, and are its top predictors upstream of the outcome or downstream of it?
  6. 6. Which outcome is the model trained to move, and did anyone check that against what the person receiving care wants?
  7. 7. Was this model evaluated on any sample other than the one it was built on, and does this setting even collect the data it needs?
  8. 8. If a person declines the monitoring, do they still get the service?
  9. 9. Once the tool is live, who inside the agency holds the authority to stop it — and who receives a report of algorithmic harm, on what clock, and what has to happen next?

For the actions behind these questions, see the Practice Library.

Seeing your organization in this domain? Mapping its actual pathways, pressures, and correction capacity is engagement work.

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Sources & Evidence

Claims made on this page and what supports them. The full registry lives in Evidence.

EmpiricalThe volume's substance-use chapter reports the field's one sustained deployment benefit case: a national healt…

The volume's substance-use chapter reports the field's one sustained deployment benefit case: a national health system's opioid risk-mitigation dashboard, an advisory clinical decision-support tool that stratifies patients for review, was evaluated in a randomized design across the system's medical centers, and use of the risk stratification was reported as associated with a decrease in mortality among the at-risk patients it covered. Three limits travel with the finding and are part of the claim. It is an association reported in a peer-reviewed secondary synthesis, not a causal result this repository can inspect: the primary evaluation is absent from the reference snapshot, so no sample size, facility count, follow-up window or effect size is carried here. It is a benefit direction on a domain this registry otherwise describes almost entirely in the failure register, and it is recorded so that the failure register is not mistaken for the whole evidence base. And it is an outcome for people who are outside the model by construction: it is never read from a Lab gauge, never a Service-Regime number, and never computed from any diagram.

saba2026AcademicAcademicSave

Saba, S., & Leibowitz, G. (2026). AI in Substance Use and Addiction Prevention. In R. An & M. A. Lindsey (Eds.), Artificial Intelligence in Social Work: Bridging Technology and Humanity. Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-18443-6_11

doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-18443-6_11

Appears in: AI in Social Work (Springer, 2026)

Grounds: model org: odmap_overdose_spike_alerts; model org: woebot_health_app

Topics: social-work, substance-use

ConceptualThe volume's governance chapter places two standing duties on an agency that deploys AI, both distinct from an…

The volume's governance chapter places two standing duties on an agency that deploys AI, both distinct from any pre-deployment approval. First, an incident-reporting protocol that enables timely identification and remediation of algorithmic harm - discriminatory treatment, a biased risk assessment, a misdiagnosis, a breach of confidentiality. Second, transparent channels through which both the people served and the practitioners can report concerns or unexpected effects, so the accountability loop closes after deployment rather than ending at approval. The chapter is a conceptual synthesis and is cited as one: its four-tier social-work risk taxonomy is labeled by its own author as an original construction, informed by but not derived from binding regulation. It may be cited as a framework and must never be presented as a regulatory classification of any deployment in this registry.

huang2026bAcademicSave

Huang, J., Yang, F., & Lee, J. (2026). Ethical Challenges and AI Governance in Social Work. In R. An & M. A. Lindsey (Eds.), Artificial Intelligence in Social Work: Bridging Technology and Humanity. Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-18443-6_22

doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-18443-6_22

Appears in: AI in Social Work (Springer, 2026)

Topics: ai-ethics, ai-governance, social-work